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Abstract
The approximated cost-bene¯t function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment
models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative ap-
proach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using
distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility e and inequality aversion pa-
rameter ° is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement
level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality
aversion parameter ° allow to narrow the variation of e for a particular value of °. As a conse-
quence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the
Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods
in rich and poor countries.
Keywords: cost-bene¯t analysis, distributional weights, global warming, welfare theory, integrated
assessment modeling.
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1 Introduction
Environmental equity is a sensible concept in global warming debates. It addresses the distributional
issue which is the cumbersome point of bene¯t-cost analysis. As per capita income is lower in poor
countries, then willingness-to-pay based estimates of damages in poor countries are lower than in the
developed countries even though the impact is identical in human, physical or ecological terms. One
way of managing this would be to use a normative approach by introducing weight factors based on the
di®erent marginal value of money in the di®erent regions of the world. This would give higher weight
to costs in the poor countries. Environmental equity can be understood as assuming a new decision
criterium that requires that the value of lost lives (also any environmental goods) in rich and poor
countries has to be weighted di®erently. The normative approach is not realistic as it does not respect
the WTP estimates which are the base of economic valuation. However, I would like to experiment in
order to test the Kyoto emissions reduction targets requiring that the value of life is identical in poor
and rich countries.
There are di®erent views in favor and against of using weight factors. I do not plan to review this
discussion. I simply assume that weight factors are considered appropriate from a normative point of
view, and then examine if the Kyoto emissions reduction targets are consistent with the requirement of
valuing the life in poor and developed countries by weighting them di®erently.
Following Ray (1984) and Stenman (2000) I obtain the equity weights by totally di®erentiating the social
welfare function. The social welfare function depends on three parameters, which are the incomes per
¤Research Unit Attainability and Global Change, Hamburg University and Center for Atmospheric Science, Bun-
desstrasse 55 (Pavillion Room 31), 20146 Hamburg, Germany +49 40 42838 6597 (voice) +49 40 42838 7009 (fax) dri-
tan.osmani@zmaw.de
1capita, the elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter °. The incomes per capita
depend on GDP, population and costs and bene¯ts from pollution abatement which are obtained from
two di®erent integrated assessment models namely the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation
and Distribution (FUND) model developed by Richard Tol, and the MITs Emissions Prediction and
Policy Analysis (EPPA) model developed at MIT. The essential point of the paper is the development of
a relation between e and ° by equalizing the value of life in poor and rich regions by following Ray (1984)
and Stenman (2000) but allowing for larger range of parameters values that relates e and °. As e and
° take their values in speci¯c intervals, there is a signi¯cant advantage to have a relation between them,
as it is possible to restrict the intervals for e and ° when the world regions are approximated in only two
types, namely poor and rich. That is, when the world social welfare for di®erent e and ° is maximized
( a global welfare optimization problem is built) and pollution abatements levels are found, one focuses
on smaller intervals for e and ° which are going to give smaller variation for abatement levels. Finally
it is possible to test if the abatement targets of Kyoto protocol respect the condition that the value of
life is identical in poor and rich countries when equity weights are used. The costs and bene¯ts from
pollution abatements are calculated for the year 2010, which is considered as the representative year of
the ¯rst commitment period of Kyoto protocol that includes the years 2008 through 2012.
The optimization global welfare models are similar to Eyckmans et al. (2002), Rose et al. (1998) and
Rose and Stevens (1993). Eyckmans et al. (2002) maximize a social welfare function (only for EU) with
only one parameter, namely e, which is less general that our social welfare function with two parameters,
namely e and °. Rose et al. (1998) minimize cost of pollution abatement (or maximize bene¯ts in Rose
and Stevens (1993)) and use di®erent international equity criteria, while in this paper a social welfare
function is maximized when value of life is equal to rich and poor countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the utility and welfare functions and derive
equity weights. The section works with di®erent types of welfare functions, including the utilitarian
(° = 0), Bernoulli-Nash (° = 1), and a special welfare function (° = 2)1. Section three assumes that the
value of life in poor and developed countries is the same by weighting them di®erently in order to derive
a relation between the elasticity of marginal utilitye and the inequality aversion parameter °. Section
four presents the optimization global welfare models without permit systems and with permit systems
for two di®erent integrated assessment models, FUND and EPPA. The sixth section presents the results.
Section seven provide the conclusions. The appendix one contains di®erent tables which present the
relation between e and °, main parameters of FUND and EPPA models, and Figures that illustrate the
optimal abatement levels of poor and rich regions. In the appendix two the results of EPPA and FUND
model without permits system are compared.
2 Utility, Welfare Function and Equity Weights






1 ¡ e + u0 ; e 6= 1
ln(Y ) + u0 ; e = 1
(1)
where e = ¡[du;=dY ]Y=u; = ¡Y u;;=u; is the income elasticity of marginal utility which shows that e is
a measure of the curvature of u(Y).











1 ¡ ° ; ° 6= 1
P
i=1:n ln(ui) ; ° = 1
(2)
where ° is the parameter of inequality aversion. The smaller is °, the smaller is the worry about equality.
For ° = 0, equation implies the classical utilitarian welfare function and ° = 1 is associated with the
Bernoulli-Nash function, while ° ! 1 represents the maximin case. However what value2 to choose for e
? Pearce (2003) suggests a simple way, in case of the classical utilitarian welfare function, for estimating
1The reason why I do not use bigger values than 2 for ° is clari¯ed in Footnote (5).
2Evans (2005) calculates the values of elasticity of marginal utility e for 20 OECD countries based on a tax-model.
However, I am going to focus on a relation between e and ° in stead of merely value of e.
2the value of e. He judges the value of e by employing equity weights in order to evaluate the climate










Y is income, ¹ Y is the average world per-capita income, P and R refers to poor and rich regions, D is









are the equity weights
for evaluating the damage in poor and rich regions. In equation (3) all damages are considered but
the damage happened to developing countries (with incomes lower than world average) attracts higher
weights than the damages in developed countries (with incomes higher than world average). One can
judge the value of e by estimating the ratio of weights between poor and rich in equation (3) (that
equals the ratio of the marginal utilities between poor and rich if the utility function of rich and poor














Assume YR = 10YP is the case for international real-income comparisons between high income coun-
tries and low income countries. At e = 1, unit damage to the poor (or a marginal unit of income) is
valued ten times the unit damage of the rich; if e = 2, the relative valuation is 100 times. On these
simple calculation basis, values even of e = 2 are not justi¯ed. The apparent consensus in the literature
(Clarkson and Deyes, 2002; Pearce and Ulph, 1999; Cowell and Gardiner, 1999; Cline, 1992) on the value
of e is 1 < e < 1:5, although Pearce and Ulph (1994) suggest e = 0:8 by using household behavior
models. What values can ° take? Firstly, note that ° must be integer in order to make possible for
welfare function to take real values and not complex ones. When e > 1 utility function takes negative
values which implies that ° will be the equality aversion parameter in stead of the inequality aversion
one (Azar, 1999). The values for ° will be found by developing in the next subsection a relation between
e and ° (Fankhauser et al., 1997; Stenman, 2000).
































i ; e = 1 8i
(5)
Equity weights must be used as the utility function can be concave in income, so that for the same
income variation, utility changes more for a poor than for a rich person; alternatively, the social welfare
function may be concave in utilities, so that the same utility variation from a low level, changes the
social welfare more than the same utility variation from a high level.
2.1 Monetary Evaluation for Environmental Quality
One of the most debated issues related to the cost-bene¯t analysis (CBA) is the fact that the economic
value of the environmental quality can be lower in poorer countries in comparison to richer ones due
to positive income elasticity for risk reductions, if one does not apply any distributional weights. The
condition for an equal monetary value of environment between poor and rich regions (or any other good











Vp () qrVr = qpVp (6)
where Vr;Vp are values of environmental quality in rich and poor regions, and qr;qp are equity weights for
rich and poor regions. After replacing in the equation (6), the derivative from equation (1) and equation
3(2), and noting that Vr=Vp = (Yr=Yp)" where " is the income elasticity of demand for environmental
equality, it results:
° =
(e ¡ ") ln(Yp=Yr)
ln(ur=up)
(7)
° has to be integer in order to ensure that welfare function takes real values (and not complex ones). It





I am going to perform a simple sensible analysis of equation (8). The income elasticity of demand " in
equation (8) is upper bound for e; when ° = 0 =) e = "; when ° increases (keeping other parameters
unchanged) e decreases as3 ln(ur=up)
ln(Yp=Yr) < 0. Therefore, it makes sense to support values of " = 1:2
which gives ° a chance of being bigger than 1 in spite of, there are evidences that the " can take also
values of 0.33. The numerical computations, by letting values of ° = f0;1;2g4, Yr=Yp = f3;4;5g and
ur=up = f1:2;1:3;1:4g, show that the value of e 2 [0:8;1:2], see Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix5 one.
The advantages of the numerical experiment above arise when there are only two types of countries, rich
and poor. As the same social welfare function is used for both types of countries, then it is possible
to ¯nd which values (or intervals) to use for e and ° in order to obtain smaller variation for optimal
abatement levels.
3 Allocation Model of Burden Sharing Emissions
The cost (bene¯t) functions from relative abatements levels for every world region (or region) i are
taken from two di®erent models which are: the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and
Distribution (FUND) model developed by Richard Tol6;the MITs Emissions Prediction and Policy Anal-
ysis (EPPA) model developed at MIT7. Two optimization problems are constructed for cost functions
speci¯ed by di®erent models: one without emissions trading and one with emissions trading. The op-
timization problems are solved by using the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox8. The variables of ¯rst
optimization problem are: Ri's are relative abatements levels for every world region i; the variables of
second optimization problem are again Ri's; the relative permissions levels for every world region i are









¡1 · Ri · 1 (11)
where SWFi is the social welfare functions for each region i. Let have:
(Zi = GDPi + Bi ¡ Ci)=POPi (12)
where GDPi is Gross Domestic Production for every region i, Bi = f(Ri);Ci = f(Ri) are the bene¯t10
and cost function for every region i, and they are function of the relative abatement level of region i, Ri.
The costs and bene¯ts from pollution abatements are calculated for the year 2010 which is considered
as the representative year of the ¯rst commitment period of the Kyoto protocol that includes the years
3 ln(ur=up)
ln(Yp=Yr) < 0 as ln(Yp=Yr) < 0; ln(up=ur) > 0 for Yp < Yr; up < ur
4° = f0;1;2g means ° = 0, ° = 1, ° = 2.
5When ° = f3;4g the value of e goes down to 0.58. Therefore, those values of ° are considered as too high.
6See Yang et al. (1996) for a description of the EPPA model.
7See Link and Tol (2004) and http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html for a description of the FUND model.
8Computing programs can be provided on request.
9The value of Rk = 3:2 is taken. Note that, as the abatement levels of individual regions are ¯nally estimated as
fractions of the global abatement levels and not in absolute terms, the selected value for Rk (also for the next optimization
problem) is not crucial.
10The bene¯t function from pollution abatement are provided only from the FUND model, while the cost function from
pollution abatement are provided from both models FUND and EPPA.













e = 1;8 ° 6= 1 (14)





8 e 6= 1;° = 1 (15)
SWFi = POPi log (logZi) e = 1;° = 1 (16)
Without constraints on the trading volumes, individually rational countries that maximize their utility
of per capita income, will reduce their carbon emissions up to the point where their marginal abatements
costs are exactly equal to the market price C
0
(Ri) = Pr. This condition de¯nes the emission reduction
supply curve RSi(Pr) = C
0¡1(Pr). The market clearing price is de¯ned as the price for which total
supply is su±cient to achieve the emissions reduction constrain RSi(Pr) = C
0¡1(Pr) = 3:2. The opti-







Ri = 3:2 (18)
X
i=1:n
RSi(Pr) = 3:2 (19)
lb · Ri · ub (20)
0 · Pr · 1000 (21)
The optimization problem 17 has the same welfare function SWF, which is de¯ned in equations (13),
(14), (15) and (16), but Zi is de¯ned di®erently:
Zi = (GDPi + Bi ¡ Ci + Pr(Ri ¡ R0)Ei)=POPi (22)
The price of selling (when selling Ri < R0, when buying Ri > R0) of 1 ton emissions equals Pr Dollars,
which changes income by Pr(Ri ¡ R0)Ei (when emission permits are bought or sold), and changes also
emissions cost, which is re°ected at the cost function Ci.
The FUND model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America (USA),
Canada (CAN), Western Europe (WEU), Japan and South Korea (JPK), Australia and New Zealand
(ANZ), Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), the Middle East (MDE),
Central America (CAM), South America (LAM), South Asia (SAS), Southeast Asia (SEA), China (CHI),
North Africa (NAF), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Small Island States (SIS). The bene¯t B and the
cost C of a country (region) i in the FUND model are given as:





where R denotes relative emission reduction, ¯ marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions, E
unabated emissions, Y gross domestic product, indexes i denote regions and ® is the cost parameter, see
Table 5.
The regions in EPPA model are United States of America (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EEC,
EC-12 as of 1992), Other OECD Countries (OOE), Eastern Europe (EET), Former Soviet Union (FSU),
Energy Exporting Countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), Dynamic Asian Economies (DAE),
Brazil (BRA) and Rest Of World (ROW). The cost C of a country (region) i in the EPPA model are
5given as:
Ci = 1=3ai(RiEi)3 + 1=2bi(RiEi)2 (24)
where R denotes relative emission reduction, a and b are the cost parameters, and E are the unabated
emissions, see Table 6.
The world regions for two models FUND and EPPA can be fairly approximated by two types, OECD
countries (or rich ones) and non-OECD countries (or poor ones)11. The social welfare function of the
same shape is used for both types of countries. The values (or intervals) of the elasticity of marginal
utility e and the inequality aversion parameter ° are taken from Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix which
make use of the equation 8. The relation between e and ° allows to narrow the variation of e for a
speci¯c value of °. As a consequence it is possible to attain smaller variation for the optimal emissions
reduction levels too.
Four di®erent types of optimization problem are considered, the ¯rst two ones are FUND (FUND-1)
model and EPPA (EPPA-1) without a permit system. The comparison between the the FUND-1 and
EPPA-1 is postponed to Appendix two, as the main purpose of comparing them, is to point out that
the results are robust. The upper and low bounds of abatement variables for the ¯rst two optimization
problem are tightened. If the bounds of variables are not contracted then the optimization for EPPA-
1 shifts all the abatement weight to region OOE (Other OECD Countries) as they have a negative
parameter (the parameter b) of cost calculation in the equation 24, which makes the results unreliable.
The last two models are, the FUND model without permits system (FUND-2), and the FUND model
with permits system (FUND-permit). The comparison between the FUND-2 and FUND-permit are
presented in the next section.
4 Results, FUND with permits and without permits system
The results of the FUND model without permits system (FUND-2) and with permits system (FUND-
permit) are discussed. The abatement levels are estimated as fractions of the global abatement levels. It
means that I focus in the fraction of abatement levels that a region (like European Union) is undertaking
but not in the absolute amount of it.
The results of FUND-2 are presented in Table 7 and in Figures 1, 3 and 5 while the results of FUND-
permit are presented in Table 8 and in Figures 2, 4 and 6. Tables 7 represents all regions and their
optimal abatement levels; di®erent values of the elasticity of marginal utility e di®erent values of the
inequality aversion parameter ° are taken into account which respect the relation of e and ° originating
from equation 8. The Figures12 introduce the optimal abatement levels for rich and poor regions for °
equal to 0, 1 and 2 and e 2 (0;1:5). The most reliable intervals of e for every speci¯c ° are explained in
every ¯gure.
In both models approach (with and without permits system), the abatement levels of poor countries are
di®erent from zero as Kyoto protocol assigns. It implies that Kyoto protocol assigns a peculiar value of
the elasticity of marginal utility e for every ° which exceeds the value of 1.5 (see Figures from 1 to 6).
The peculiar choose of e for every ° leads to a selection of abatement levels which are not optimal.
Former Soviet Union has to abate pollution in large amounts, which is not foreseen in Kyoto protocol. All
model approaches (EPPA-1, FUND-1, FUND-2 and FUND-permit) for every combination of parameters
e and °, predict that FSU has to play a central role in abatement policies among non-OECD countries.
Therefore, it is considered as a robust result (see Tables 7 and 8).
FUND-permit is highly overestimating the optimal abatement level of Western European Union (by
132%). This result is also not robust as FUND-1 and EPPA-1 estimate the optimal abatement level of
WEU similar to USA (EPPA-1 even lower than USA and equal to Japan)). However, seeing beyond
11Concerning FUND model, the world regions of United States of America (USA), Canada (CAN), Western Europe
(WEU), Japan and South Korea (JPK), Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) are considered as OECD countries (or rich
ones), and the rest of regions as non-OECD ones (or poor ones) while concerning EPPA model, world regions of United
States of America (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EEC, EC-12 as of 1992), Other OECD Countries (OOE) are
considered as OECD countries (or rich ones), and the rest of regions as non-OECD ones (or poor ones)
12Numerical instability is experienced for the single point e = 1 when ° = 2, therefore in Figures 5 and 6 a circle is
placed in this particular point. However, the optimal abatement levels for the cumbersome point are presented in Tables
7 and 8, and they are consistent with conclusions. I think that the numerical instability is inherited from the shape of the
social welfare function because the numerical experiments with the SWF for e 6= 1 (when ° = 2, see equation 13) and,
e = 1 (when ° = 2, see equation 14) show that there is discontinuity for both types of functions for the neighborhood of
particular point e = 1 (which must not be).
6simple numbers, it is only a reinforcement that WEU is a key player in global abatement policies. USA
has to undertake usually the highest abatement target (sometime WEU has higher abatement target)
among all world regions which strengthens the conclusions that there is no successful climate change
policy without USA. Japan (JPN) has to abate their pollution levels lower than USA and WEU but
higher than any other country (except the FSU which surpass sometimes the abatement levels of Japan).
Regions like Canada, Australia, China, India and East European Countries are changing their optimal
abatement levels in a wide range from very low (or even negative ones) to some considerable amounts
which certify that it is hard based on available information, to assign those countries the "right" abate-
ment level.
5 Conclusions
The paper examines if the abatement targets that Kyoto protocol assigns to di®erent countries, are
consistent with the normative requirement that environmental goods are valued equally in non-OECD
(or poor) and OECD (or rich) countries. Several di®erent global welfare maximization problems with
permits system and without permits system are established, which are constrained to the same speci¯c
global abatement level. A wide range of social welfare functions is used such as the utilitarian (° = 0),
Bernoulli-Nash (° = 1), and a special welfare function (° = 2). In global welfare maximization problems,
I make use of bene¯ts and costs of pollution abatement for two di®erent integrated assessment models, the
Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model developed by Richard
Tol, and the MITs Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model developed at MIT.
By demanding that environmental goods are evaluated equally in non-OECD (or poor) and OECD (or
rich) countries and using equity weights, a relation between the elasticity of marginal utility e and the
inequality aversion parameter ° is set up. The relation helps us to contract the intervals of e for particular
values of °. Furthermore, it supports us to tighten the variation of optimal abatement levels when global
social welfare is maximized.
It is found that the abatement targets of Kyoto protocol assume only a peculiar value for elasticity of
marginal utility e for any possible given value of °. This peculiar value of e produces no abatement
level for developing countries which is not an optimal target. From the other side, the abatement levels
for developed countries are correctly assigned. On the opposite the Former Soviet Union has to play a
central role among developing countries which is not foreseen in Kyoto protocol. Regions like Canada,
Australia, China, India and East European Countries are changing their optimal abatement levels in a
wide range which indicates that it is di±cult to assign an abatement target to those countries.
As always, further extensions are possible such as the implementation of dynamic framework for a longer
time interval, or ¯nding a way of including of political factors in modeling approach.
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7Appendix 1
Table 1: The values of elasticity of marginal utility e for di®erent values of °, when ur=up = 1:2,
Yr=Yp = 5, " = 1:2.
° = 0 ° = 1 ° = 2
1.2 1.1408 1.0816
Table 2: The values of elasticity of marginal utility e for di®erent values of ° and ur=up, when Yr=Yp = 5,
" = 1:2.
° = 0 ° = 1 ° = 2
ur=up = 1:2 1.2 1.0867 0.9734
ur=up = 1:3 1.2 1.037 0.874
ur=up = 1:4 1.2 0.9909 0.7819
Table 3: The values of elasticity of marginal utility e for di®erent values of ° and Yr=Yp, when ur=up =
1:2, " = 1:2.
° = 0 ° = 1 ° = 2 ° = 3 ° = 4
Zr=Zp = 3 1.2 1.0685 0.937 0.8054 0.6739
Zr=Zp = 4 1.2 1.0982 0.9965 0.8947 0.793
Zr=Zp = 5 1.2 1.117 1.034 0.9511 0.8681
Table 4: The values of elasticity of marginal utility e for di®erent values of °, Zr=Zp and ur=up, when
" = 1:2.
° = 0 ° = 1 ° = 2 ° = 3 ° = 4
Zr=Zp = 3 1.2 1.0685 0.937 0.8054 0.6739 ur=up = 1:2
Zr=Zp = 4 1.2 1.0536 0.9071 0.7607 0.6143 ur=up = 1:3
Zr=Zp = 5 1.2 1.0469 0.8937 0.7406 0.5875 ur=up = 1:4
8Table 5: The FUND data from the year 2010, where ® is the abatement cost parameter (unitless), ¯
the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon) E the carbon
dioxide emissions (in billion metric tonnes of carbon), Y gross domestic product, in billions US dollars
and population in millions people. Source: FUND
.
® ¯ E Y Population
USA 0.0152 2.0882 1.7315 11886 295.1
CAN 0.0152 0.0966 0.1315 93 33
WEU 0.0157 3.1036 0.786 14072 39.2
JPK 0.0156 -1.1404 0.5675 9829 185.7
ANZ 0.0151 -0.0257 0.0855 526 25.3
EEU 0.0147 0.1057 0.189 476 122.4
FSU 0.0138 1.1862 0.952 751 291.5
MDE 0.0144 0.1087 0.4875 742 292.2
CAM 0.0149 0.0833 0.126 456 155.5
LAM 0.0151 0.2542 0.2445 1578 390.7
SAS 0.0144 0.3678 0.6575 1064 1585.6
SEA 0.0149 0.7108 0.413 1432 600.8
CHI 0.0145 4.7834 1.6145 3085 1429.7
NAF 0.0147 0.8981 0.1105 261 176.5
SSA 0.0147 0.9469 0.157 374 810.1
SIS 0.0144 0.0627 0.0435 66 49.7
Table 6: The EPPA data from the year 2010, where a, b are the abatement cost parameters (in dollars
per tonne of carbon, a + b is the marginal damage costs of ¯rst tonne of carbon dioxide emissions), E
the carbon dioxide emissions (in billion metric tonnes of carbon), Y gross domestic product, in billions
US dollars and population in millions people. Source: EPPA and Weikard et al. (2006)
.
a b E Y Population
USA 0.0005 0.0398 2.42 8845 305
JPN 0.0155 1.816 0.56 5584 124
EEC 0.0024 0.1503 1.4 9579 375
OOE 0.0085 -0.0986 0.62 1902 142
EET 0.0079 0.0486 0.51 405 120
FSU 0.0023 0.0042 1 501 287
EEX 0.0032 0.3029 1.22 1650 1602
CHN 0.0001 0.0239 2.36 1021 1340
IND 0.0015 0.0787 0.63 458 1145
DAE 0.0047 0.3774 0.41 972 207
BRA 0.5612 8.4974 0.13 774 190
ROW 0.0021 0.0805 0.7 1119 584
9Table 7: Relative abatement levels (as ration of global abatement levels) for di®erent world regions,
FUND model without permits system (boundshigh, equal constrains)
° = 0;e = 1:2 ° = 1;e = 0:9 ° = 2;e = 0:8 e = 0:9 e = 1 e = 1:1
USA 0.62 0.34 0.62 0.46 1.95 0.25
CAN -0.48 -0.13 -0.48 -0.28 -2.08 -0.03
WEU 1.52 0.85 1.52 1.19 2.5 0.56
JPK 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.17 1.25 0.1
ANZ -0.74 -0.28 -0.74 -0.5 -2.18 -0.13
EEU -0.05 -0.004 -0.05 -0.03 -0.54 0.02
FSU 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.15 0.19
MDE 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.07
CAM -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.32 -0.01
LAM -0.004 0.01 -0.004 0.002 0.03 0.01
SAS 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.003 0.02
SEA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
CHI 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
NAF -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.01
SSA -0.01 -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.001
SIS -0.31 -0.21 -0.31 -0.27 -0.08 -0.15
Table 8: Relative abatement levels (as ration of global abatement levels) for di®erent world regions,
FUND model in a permits system (boundshigh, equal constrains)
° = 0;e = 1:2 ° = 1;e = 0:9 ° = 2;e = 0:8 e = 0:9 e = 1 e = 1:1
USA 0.6 0.34 0.6 0.45 2 0.23
CAN -0.84 -0.43 -0.85 -0.63 -2.12 -0.3
WEU 1.32 0.63 1.32 0.96 2.33 0.39
JPK 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.1 0.57 0.07
ANZ -1.09 -0.65 -1.09 -0.86 -2.12 -0.48
EEU -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.56 0.02
FSU 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.62 0.51
MDE 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.21
CAM -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02
LAM 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.17 0.02
SAS 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
SEA 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08
CHI 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.2
NAF -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.003 0.03 0.02
SSA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.1
SIS -0.31 -0.26 -0.31 -0.28 0.05 -0.25






























Figure 1: The relation between fractional abatement levels A (for poor countries Ap and for rich countries
Ar) and values of elasticity of marginal utility e when ° = 0 without permit trading system, FUND model.
Note that when ° = 0, e = 1.2 so values of A corresponding to e = 1.2 are considered as more realistic.






























Figure 2: The relation between fractional abatement levels A (for poor countries Ap and for rich countries
Ar) and values of elasticity of marginal utility e when ° = 0 in permit trading system, FUND model.






























Figure 3: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 1 without permit trading system, FUND model. Note that when ° = 1, e 2 (0:99;1:1) so
values of E corresponding to e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.





























Figure 4: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 1 in permit trading system, FUND model. Note that when ° = 1, e 2 (0:99;1:1) so values
of E corresponding to e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.






























Figure 5: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 2 without permit trading system, FUND model. Note that when ° = 2, e 2 (0:78;1:08) so
values of E corresponding to e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.






























Figure 6: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 2 in permit trading system, FUND model. Note that when ° = 2, e 2 (0:78;1:08) so values
of E corresponding to e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.
13Appendix 2
5.1 Comparing results for FUND and EPPA models without permits
The ¯rst optimization problem is primarily used in order to make clear that results are robust as esti-
mations from two di®erent models FUND and EPPA display similarities13.
Table 9, Figures 7, 9 and 11 present the results for FUND model while Table 10, Figures 8 and 10
present the results for EPPA model. Tables 9 represent all regions and their optimal abatement levels
(for FUND model) for values of the elasticity of marginal utility e that corresponds to the values of
inequality aversion parameter ° (according to relation of e and ° from equation 8). The Figures14 intro-
duce the optimal abatement levels for rich and poor regions for ° equal to 0, 1 and 2 and e 2 (0;1:5).
The most reliable intervals of e for every ° that equals 0, 1 and 2 are given for every ¯gure.
The results demonstrate similar pattern, namely the abatement levels of rich countries are higher than
those of poor countries (see Figures from 7 to 10 and Tables 9 and 10). But the abatement levels of poor
countries are not zero. The FUND model predicts that the optimal abatement levels of poor countries
are in the range of 37 % to 50 % of the total global level, while the EPPA model predicts that the optimal
abatement levels of poor countries are in the range from 11 % to 46 % of the total global level. The
models a±rm that the Kyoto protocol assigns a peculiar value to the marginal elasticity of substitution
e for any value of the inequality aversion parameter °, which advices no abatement e®orts for poor
countries. Both models also forecast that the Former Soviet Union (FSU) must have a high abatement
level which anticipates the Kyoto target for FSU. They assign to China (respectively 2% and 0:2%) and
India (respectively 1% and 0:4%) low abatement targets.
The main di®erence between models is that EPPA assigns to other OECD countries (OOE where Canada
and Australia are essential players) a high abatement level of 42%, while FUND assigns to Canada and
Australia together only 24%. Other di®erences, the changes in abatement levels for Western European
Union, Japan and Eastern European Countries.
13When comparing FUND with EPPA, I use lower bounds equal to -1, while upper bounds equal to 1. Those bounds are
used as EPPA models shifts all abatement burdens to region OOE (other OECD countries) as they have partly bene¯ts
from pollution abatement (the parameter cost b is negative, see Table 6).
14Numerical instability is experienced for the single point e = 1 when ° = 2 for FUND model, and for the interval
e 2 (0:8;1:08) when ° = 2 for EPPA model. Therefore, a circle is placed in the point e = 1 in Figures 11. This happens,
as already clari¯ed in Footnote 12, because the shape of Social Welfare Function with two parameters (e and °) behaves
inappropriately at the point e = 1 (when gamma = 2). We experience numerical instability when ° = 2, which is located in
an interval (not in a single point) for EPPA model. The stopping criteria for the optimization problem are su±ciently small
(around 10¡19), which help to think that the numerical instability occurs because the variation of the optimal abatement
levels is very sensible to the variations of elasticity of marginal utility e. There is no Figure for EPPA model when ° = 2,
but the results of optimization problem are shown in the Table 10. Anyway, the variation of the optimal abatement levels
stays in an interval that makes possible to claim that the EPPA results have a similar pattern with FUND, and therefore,
are still robust.
14Table 9: Relative abatement levels (as ration of global abatement levels) for di®erent world regions,
FUND model, second optimization problem without permits system (boundslow)
° = 0;e = 1:2 ° = 1;e = 0:9 ° = 2;e = 0:8 e = 0:9 e = 1 e = 1:1
USA 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.15
CAN 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.1
WEU 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.17
JPK 0.12 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.07
ANZ 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.09
EEU 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05
FSU 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.12
MDE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06
CAM 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03
LAM 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02
SAS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.02
SEA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
CHI 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
NAF 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
SSA 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01
SIS 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.004 0.03
Table 10: Relative abatement levels (as ration of global abatement levels) for di®erent world regions,
EPPA model, second optimization problem without permits system (boundslow)
° = 0;e = 1:2 ° = 1;e = 0:9 ° = 2;e = 0:8 e = 0:9 e = 1 e = 1:1
USA 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.06
JPN 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.03
EEC 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.04
OOE 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.42
EET 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.16
FSU 0.15 0.2 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.21
EEX 0.0006 0.001 0.002 0.0004 0 0.001
CHN 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0 0.003
IND 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.0002 0.01
DAE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03
BRA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ROW 0.02 0.03 0.005 0.01 0.005 0.03






























Figure 7: The relation between fractional abatement levels A (for poor countries Ap and for rich countries
Ar) and values of elasticity of marginal utility e when ° = 0, FUND model. Note that when ° = 0, e =
1.2 so values of A corresponding to e = 1.2 are considered as more realistic.






























Figure 8: The relation between fractional abatement levels A (for poor countries Ap and for rich countries
Ar) and values of elasticity of marginal utility e when ° = 0, EPPA model. Note that when ° = 0, e =





























Figure 9: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 1, FUND model. Note that when ° = 1, e 2 (0:99;1:1) so values of E corresponding to
































Figure 10: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 1, EPPA model. Note that when ° = 1, e 2 (0:99;1:1) so values of E corresponding to
e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.






















Figure 11: The relation between fractional abatement levels A and values of elasticity of marginal utility
e when ° = 2, FUND model. Note that when ° = 2, e 2 (0:78;1:08) so values of E corresponding to
e 2 (0:78;1:08) are considered as more realistic.
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